Consequences of delayed CDR actions: extra-costs and under-exploitation of resources
We start by analyzing the implications on costs and emissions of delaying the large-scale deployment of BECCS and DACCS. To this end, we apply an energy systems model (i.e., RAPID) that captures the interplay between the CDR technologies and the power sector to identify the minimum cost (Fig. 1a) and maximum net negative emissions potential (Fig. 1b) roadmaps, starting the CDR deployment at different points in time in 2020–2100 (optimal solutions every five years depicted with markers in Fig. 1). RAPID identifies the optimal portfolio of power technologies, BECCS and DACCS, including their location and installed capacities, which may vary over time to meet a given energy demand pattern and CO2removal target (details in Methods).
We first investigate the economic implications of delaying CDR for various net CO2 emissions targets, finding that postponing CDR increases the removal cost, first smoothly and then sharply as we further postpone actions (Fig. 1a). For example, reaching carbon neutrality by 2100 by deploying BECCS and DACCS from 2020 would cost 22.8 trillion EUR2015 (in the range 18.6–26.6, uncertainty analysis in the Supplementary Tables 43–50), and 24.1 when starting in 2075 (18.2–29.5), while it would become infeasible when starting after 2080. Delaying actions would reduce the amount of cheap biomass available, making it necessary to resort to the more expensive DACCS to attain the CDR target (109–155 EUR2015 t−1 CO2 for DACCS considering optimistic prospects vs. 61–86 EUR2015 t−1 CO2 with BECCS). For example, to meet a target of −50 Gt net of CO2, DACCS would have to remove 9% of the cumulative gross negative emissions needed by 2100 when starting in 2020, and up to 40% for a delayed start in 2050, after which this indicative CDR target would be unattainable. For the same CDR target, each year of CDR inaction would increase the removal cost in the range of 0.12-0.19 trillion EUR2015 by 2100. The opportunity cost of delaying CDR would vary over time, depending on the gradual mix decarbonization and improvements attained via learning curves (e.g., CAPEX of DACCS expected to become c.a. 70% cheaper in 2050 relative to 2020, Supplementary Table 14).
We next focus on the feasibility of the removal roadmaps, assuming an emergency plan to maximize CDR, starting actions in different years. We find that delaying CDR constrains the total removal potential substantially (Fig. 1b), again, first smoothly and then sharply. Notably, postponing the deployment of BECCS and DACCS beyond 2050 might prevent the EU from removing −50 Gt CO2 before 2100 (i.e., EU emissions emitted in the last decade56,60), while delays beyond 2080 might even impede reaching carbon neutrality in the power sector. The EU would maximize its CDR potential by deploying BECCS and DACCS from today (i.e., net −73.73 Gt CO2 by 2100 starting from 2020, Fig. 1b). This maximum CDR potential would be constrained by the geological storage capacity in the EU, estimated at 90.53 Gt CO2 for hydrocarbon reservoirs and aquifers61. In practice, however, the final amount of CDR that could be delivered will be subject to social acceptance issues, regulatory limitations, competition for resources, and economic feasibility challenges. For example, deploying BECCS at scale will be challenging due to the competition for land and water with food production and other sustainability concerns, including the high demand for fertilizers required to sustain the bioenergy crops62. These issues could be addressed (to some extent) by resorting to marginal land and residues and implementing sustainable management practises62,63,64. Hence, the biomass potentials linked to the availability of residues and marginal land are affected by uncertainties. Notably, competition for the limited biomass resources available will likely emerge due to the biomass versatility to decarbonize different sectors (e.g., transport), while marginal land availability might vary greatly due to improvements in agriculture or dietary changes65. We performed a sensitivity analysis to study the effects of these uncertainties, finding that reducing the biomass availability (i.e., −25% of the original estimates, Supplementary Fig. 2), would not change the maximum CDR substantially starting actions today (−70.04 Gt CO2 by 2100). This is because the storage capacity would still act as the main bottleneck. However, when CDR actions are delayed beyond 2050, the reduced availability of biomass would result in a significant drop in the maximum CO2 removed (e.g., −17% and −33% starting in 2050 and 2060, respectively). The costs of the power system would also increase when biomass availability is constrained further due to the need to resort to DACCS from the early years. Note that our results only consider domestic biomass resources and onshore geological sites. However, imported biomass and CO2 storage capacity beyond the EU borders and offshore storage sites may substantially increase the potential despite facing international governance issues while posing sustainability and social justice questions66,67. Hence, considering other CO2 storage options (e.g., mineral trapping) or other strategies beyond the power sector (e.g., planting trees or improving soil carbon sequestration) could further increase the EU’s CDR ambition. For example, leaving aside the shortcomings related to permanence and vulnerability of the carbon sequestration in trees, reforesting the EU countries could provide an additional removal potential of 0.91 Gt CO2 per year until the sink saturates (i.e., 30 years when the forest reaches the steady-state). Similarly, improved management practices such as delaying harvests or adopting reduced-impact logging would further remove 0.07 Gt CO2 per year by 210037,68. The gradual temporal decline in CDR potential is due to the underused resources (i.e., biomass residues and unexploited marginal land to grow energy crops) and the maximum diffusion rates of the CDR technologies. Lacking sufficient BECCS capacity to process the biomass residues, they would degrade and eventually release the biogenic carbon to the air in the form of CO2, while the unused marginal land would represent an opportunity lost. Furthermore, the technology diffusion factor constraining the deployment speed (e.g., 20% of annual capacity up-scaling69) critically limits the maximum attainable DACCS capacity. The potential reduction varies linearly over time for BECCS (green curve in Fig. 1b) and follows a sigmoidal shape for DACCS, with a critical point around 2045. This behavior is due to the unused biomass and land resources, the main factors constraining BECCS, which accumulate almost linearly over time. In contrast, the maximum attainable DACCS capacity, only limited by the diffusion rate, increases exponentially over time; consequently, further delays result in much fewer DACCS plants ready to be deployed on time.
Overall, in both the cost-optimal and the maximum removal roadmap, BECCS emerges as predominant regardless of the starting year, providing double benefits by contributing to CDR while delivering reliable power to meet the demand (CDR contribution breakdown in pie charts in Fig. 1a, b). When maximizing the CDR potential, the DACCS contribution increases with later starting years, while the BECCS contribution declines due to the loss of biomass potential (e.g., DACCS from 23% starting in 2020 to 46% in 2045, Fig. 1b for the yellow profile). However, the initial capacity for DACCS of 1 Mt of CO2 captured per year—reflecting the current scale ambition—and the maximum growth rate of 20%/yr observed in the historical deployment of power technologies19,51,69 would strongly limit the maximum DACCS capacity when actions are further delayed. Hence, deploying DACCS from 2050 would result in a contribution of −30.57 Gt of CO2 by 2100 (i.e., 42% of the total gross −72.94 Gt of CO2removed), while the DACCS share starting after 2080 would become negligible (i.e., <2%). In contrast, the BECCS initial capacity set to 250 MW—reflecting the state-of-the-art largest biomass-fired power plants—results in the deployment pace being limited mainly by the geological capacity, except when starting actions near 2100, where the diffusion rate constraint becomes the bottleneck. Notably, the synergetic integration of BECCS with DACCS into the energy system emerges as an appealing option to enhance the CO2 removal capacity (yellow curve showing always higher net CO2 removal than the green and blue profiles). Therefore, deploying DACCS appears as a complementary option under a rapid emergency deployment, lacking biomass resources or if BECCS deployment is constrained by the diffusion speed, being environmentally benefited from the carbon-negative electricity supplied by BECCS at the expense of increasing costs19,52,70.
Our findings are particularly relevant in the context of the EU Green Deal aiming at climate neutrality by 2050. The EU Climate Law fails to explicitly discuss the role of CDR technologies (other than land sink removals) to meet such a goal. However, to become climate neutral in 2050 (and provide negative emissions beyond then), it seems clear that some countries and sectors will rely on CDR to offset emissions. In this context, the EU power sector will likely play a key role in meeting the climate neutrality target by reaching net-zero emissions before 2050 and then becoming carbon negative to compensate emissions from hard-to-abate sectors. Considering the 2020 to 2050 horizon, delaying the deployment of BECCS and DACCS beyond 2040 might prevent the EU power sector from reaching carbon neutrality in 2050 (e.g., –0.85 Gt CO2 by 2050 starting in 2040) while increasing the costs in the range of 0.04–0.10 trillion EUR per year of inaction (Supplementary Fig. 3). Therefore, promoting the near-term integration of those technologies at the earliest is vital to ensure that they can be deployed to the extent required to meet the long-term goals.
Emissions pathways through 2100 for delayed CDR actions
We next analyze the emission pathways, considering three representative scenarios, namely, NOW, SLOW, and LATE, which maximize the removal potential starting CDR actions in years 2020, 2055, and 2085, respectively (Methods section). The net CO2 emissions balance accounts for the: i) gross removal, i.e., total CO2 removed from the air, either via photosynthesis (BECCS) or through physicochemical processes (DACCS); ii) anthropogenic life cycle emissions embodied in the power technologies, BECCS and DACCS supply chains; and, iii) CO2 emissions during biomass/natural gas combustion in BECCS/DACCS facilities, respectively, due to capture efficiencies below 100%. These emissions contributions vary across pathways, which differ in the availability of resources and maximum BECCS and DACCS capacities (constrained by the technology diffusion rates).
In the NOW scenario (Fig. 2a), starting CDR actions in 2020, the gross negative emissions would amount to −94.05 Gt CO2 by 2100, mostly provided by BECCS (77% in absolute terms) and a small contribution by DACCS (23%), yielding −73.73 Gt of net CO2 removed from the atmosphere. This scenario shows the largest positive residual emissions (+20.31 Gt CO2), 63% attributed to the uncaptured biogenic CO2 and the life cycle emissions linked to BECCS supply chains (+7.11 and +5.74 Gt CO2, respectively), 30% due to the life cycle emissions of the other power technologies (excluding BECCS), 5% associated with the life cycle emissions from DACCS and, finally, a marginal contribution from the CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure (<+1%). This scenario would fully exhaust the domestic storage capacity in the EU, which would act as a bottleneck for CDR. Furthermore, almost all the biomass resources available would be exploited (i.e., 95% of the biomass residues and 94% of marginal land), with a small amount lost due to the limited rate at which BECCS could be scaled up during the first years (Supplementary Fig. 4). The overall storage efficiency —i.e., total net CO2 removed per kg of CO2 stored— would reach 81%, where most geological sites would store the biogenic CO2captured via BECCS (71%), a smaller amount of atmospheric CO2 captured with DACCS (24%), and finally the captured emissions linked to the heating needs of DACCS (5%). Notably, when starting CDR actions today, the geological capacity needed to store the CO2 captured in fossil power plants with CCS would be negligible, thus delivering the maximum CDR constrained by the domestic storage capacity (Fig. 3). DACCS would play a role in complementing BECCS and ultimately helping to remove CO2 at the pace required, benefiting from the carbon-negative electricity delivered in the system, and exploiting its flexibility to be located closer to the geological sites in countries with scarce biomass resources52,70.
In the SLOW scenario starting CDR actions in 2055, the maximum gross and net removal potential would drop considerably (−49.61 Gt and −35.60 Gt, respectively, vs. −94.05 Gt and −73.73 Gt in the NOW scenario), while the storage capacity would not be fully exhausted (only 57% of the capacity utilized). Notably, net negative CO2 emissions would not be achieved until 2070 due to the need to offset the residual emissions taking place until that year. Before 2080, the deployment rate would limit the BECCS removal capacity, while beyond 2080, biomass resources would become the bottleneck (residues and land). 86% of the residues and 90% of the marginal land available from 2055 to 2100 would be exploited, representing only 63% and 57% of their respective total potentials (if actions were started in 2020 and continued until 2100). In contrast, the maximum deployment rate would constrain the DACCS capacity (Supplementary Fig. 4). Furthermore, the storage efficiency would be reduced to 69%, with 88% of the storage devoted to atmospheric carbon and the remaining part storing fossil carbon (i.e., from natural gas combustion powering DACCS and power plants with CCS). The global EU geological storage capacity would not be fully depleted5, yet competition between fossil and atmospheric captured CO2 for the sites available at the regional level could become an issue, particularly given the increasing policy support for CCS in fossil-fired power plants in many countries71.
Finally, in the LATE scenario, the maximum gross negative emissions would be substantially reduced to −7.09 Gt CO2. The removal potential would be limited by the maximum diffusion rates of BECCS and DACCS, which would even impede reaching CO2 neutrality in the EU power sector (+1.54 Gt of net CO2 emissions by 2100) and constrain the use of residues and land to 40% and 20% of their maximum availability from 2020 to 2100, respectively. Most of the biomass resources would be consumed by biomass power without CCS during the inaction periods (only 8% of the total residues and 14% of the land available in the period 2020–2100 would be exploited with BECCS after 2085). Here, DACCS would play a minor role, removing only −0.05 Gt of CO2 by 2100 due to the slow speed at which it could be scaled up. The storage efficiency would substantially decrease, with 25% of the total capacity available devoted to fossil CO2 emissions.
Overall, delaying the CDR deployment would lead to the underuse of biomass and land resources, tighter bounds on the BECCS and DACCS facilities, and domestic storage sites depleted with fossil carbon, which altogether would reduce the future ability of individual countries on CDR. However, transboundary agreements enabling import/exports of biomass and CO2, new estimates of suitable geological sites, less conservative biomass potentials, and a broader CDR portfolio beyond the energy sector could enhance the EU’s ability to deliver net negative emissions37.
Regional implications for the energy systems
The carbon-negative electricity supplied by BECCS and the large electricity and heating requirements of DACCS create strong links between them and the power system. Therefore, their deployment would require long-term planning, ensuring their effective integration into the evolving portfolio of power technologies starting at the earliest. In the NOW scenario (shown in Fig. 3, SLOW and LATE scenarios in Supplementary Figs. 5 and 6, respectively), the total electricity generated in the EU by 2100 would be produced mostly by wind onshore (41%), followed by nuclear (23%), BECCS (8%), hydropower run-of-river and wind offshore (both with 7%), concentrated solar power (6%), hydropower from reservoirs (6%), and marginal contributions from natural gas, solar photovoltaic open ground, biomass w/o CCS, and geothermal (<1%) (Fig. 3a). Notably, BECCS becomes relevant in the generation portfolio, providing firm capacity and ancillary services to support the high penetration of intermittent technologies with dispatchable carbon-negative electricity. Overall, a handful of countries would shoulder most of the CDR efforts. Only four countries would deliver almost half of the gross removal by 2100, with France and Spain at the top deploying both BECCS and DACCS, followed by Germany and Sweden deploying only BECCS (i.e., 44.37 Gt out of 94.05 Gt of gross CO2 removed, Fig. 3b).
Most of the BECCS capacity would be installed in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Finland (69% of the total), exploiting their abundant biomass resources and also taking advantage of their central location (in the case of Germany and Poland). Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Poland would provide most of the biomass resources, i.e., 54% of the total gross CO2 removed via BECCS (−38.99 out of −72.59 Gt of CO2 removed with BECCS, Fig. 3b). Both forestry and agricultural residues would be fully exploited in all countries starting BECCS deployment from today. Forestry residues would contribute the most to the CO2 removal (i.e., 45% of the total gross CO2 removed by 2100), while miscanthus production would occupy all the marginal land available due to its overall superior carbon sequestration potential, removing −15.87 Gt CO2 by 2100 (17% of the total gross removed) and becoming the main carbon sink in some countries (i.e., −6.16 Gt CO2 removed in Spain). Switchgrass would also be cultivated in some regions, and the storage capacity would no longer be the bottleneck if actions were further delayed (SLOW and LATE scenarios in Supplementary Figs. 5b and 6b, respectively). This is due to its relatively higher carbon removal capacity (i.e., CO2 uptake per kg of pellets), which provides more CDR in the remaining time but at the expense of reducing the electricity delivered owing to its lower energy density.
Regarding DACCS, the configuration relying on electricity and heating would be the only one installed, benefiting from the decarbonized electricity mix. In the NOW scenario, DACCS would be established in eleven countries, with France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Romania providing 97% of the gross removal from DACCS (i.e., −18,72 out of the −21.46 Gt CO2by 2100), all of them with enough geological sites for storing the captured CO2 domestically (Fig. 3b). For example, in France, −6.65 Gt CO2 would be removed via DACCS by 2100, taking advantage of its abundant saline aquifers and decarbonized mix dominated by wind onshore and nuclear (Fig. 3a). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, which lacks enough biomass resources to exploit its storage capacity only with BECCS, −3.64 Gt CO2 would be removed with DACCS and stored in domestic geological sites. In practice, this roadmap would require a substantial number of DACCS facilities across the EU, i.e., around 268, with a capacity of 1 Mt CO2/yr (i.e., the largest DAC plant under development today), out of which 83 would be installed in France, 61 in Spain and 46 in the United Kingdom. These DACCS plants would make the said countries incur extra costs and suffer adverse environmental impacts, such as those linked to the land requirements of the air contactors and the energy technologies powering them. Delaying actions until 2055 (SLOW scenario) would imply that less biomass is available, so the BECCS capacity would diminish accordingly, and additionial DACCS facilities would be deployed in Czech Republic, Denmark, and Slovakia to maximize CDR, taking advantage of the geological storage available (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Wind capacity would be massively deployed in most countries, becoming the dominant source in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland (NOW scenario in Fig. 3a). Notably, offshore wind would become predominant in some countries, with 82% of the EU capacity located in the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. Solar power plants would be deployed mostly in southern locations (i.e., Spain, Italy, and Greece), with substantial capacities of concentrating solar thermal power installed in high irradiation areas providing dispatchable renewable electricity. Some countries would also exploit their hydropower capacities, such as Austria, France, Italy, Sweden, and Spain. The contribution of nuclear by 2100 would fall in the range 0.28-35.84 TWh, with France showing the largest shares and the Netherlands the lowest. No single new nuclear plant would be installed because we assume that the capacity of this technology cannot be expanded. The existing coal plants would be completely phased out. Natural gas plants w/o CCS would still be required in United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and the islands (Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus), while playing a marginal role in the others. Overall, the integrated power-CDR system would result in carbon-negative electricity due to the high penetration of BECCS in the EU power system (i.e., −0.24 t CO2/MWh), yet it would unavoidably increase the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) to 113.03 €/MWh.
The optimal roadmap, assuming full cooperation among EU countries, would entail an intensive trade of biomass, CO2, and electricity (Fig. 4 for the NOW scenario and SLOW and LATE scenarios in Supplementary Figs. 7 and 8). However, to minimize the transport flows, the vast majority of the biomass demand would still be supplied domestically, the captured CO2 stored locally, and the electricity generated consumed on-site (domestic consumption in Fig. 4 depicted with the chords leaving and entering the same country). Some regions would be net exporters of biomass (e.g., France or Sweden) and some net importers (e.g., Netherland, Germany, or Denmark). The same would apply to CO2, with, for example, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Romania acting as net importers and the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, or Portugal becoming net exporters. Regarding electricity trade, countries such as France, Spain, and Sweden would emerge as pivotal in the power system, acting as net exporters of electricity to exploit their abundant low-carbon intensity resources (e.g., electricity trades from France to Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, Fig. 4c).
The largest exchanges of biomass and CO2 would occur between France-the Netherlands, and the Netherlands-the United Kingdom, respectively (Fig. 4a, b). Notably, Sweden would export biomass resources to Germany and Denmark to fully exploit its abundant forestry residues (i.e., 1.34 and 1.15 Gt of pellets on a dry basis, respectively, Fig. 4a). Other countries would export CO2, e.g., Finland would send 2.21 Gt CO2 via pipeline to the abundant deep saline aquifers and hydrocarbon fields in Sweden (CO2 trades in Fig. 4b). Some countries would be almost self-sufficient in terms of biomass resources, like Portugal, which would transport CO2to the Spanish geological sites due to its low geological capacity. Overall, the transport of electricity (and CO2) would be prioritized over the transport of biomass due to the larger emissions of the latter considering a given electricity demand (e.g., 0.01 vs. 0.11 kg CO2 to satisfy one kWh in an importing country, respectively, considering miscanthus as biomass source and a distance of 800 km in both cases). Hence, BECCS plants would be mostly installed near the biomass sources, leading to decentralized supply chains spread across the EU territory. However, some countries would still import biomass pellets to reduce their reliance on energy from outside the country’s borders and to support the high penetration of intermittent wind and solar with dispatchable carbon-negative electricity from BECCS (e.g., the Netherlands importing pellets from France or Denmark from Sweden, Fig. 4a).
The uneven distribution of domestic capacities (i.e., biomass resources, storage sites, and renewable resources) would make national and transnational collaboration essential to exploit bio-geophysical endowments67,72 and remove CO2 to the extent required. Hence, new agreements and regulatory frameworks will be needed, and shaping them may further delay CDR deployment.
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